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Abstract
Within just over one month of coming into operation in May 2014, the new Bail Act 2013
(NSW), a product of long‐term law reform consideration, was reviewed and then amended
after talk‐back radio ‘shock jock’ and tabloid newspaper outcry over three cases. This article
examines the media triggers, the main arguments of the review conducted by former New
South Wales (NSW) Attorney General John Hatzistergos, and the amendments, with our
analysis of the judicial interpretation of the Act thus far providing relevant background. We
argue that the amendments are premature, unnecessary, create complexity and confusion,
and, quite possibly, will have unintended consequences: in short, they are a mess. The whole
process of reversal is an example of law and order politics driven by the shock jocks and
tabloid media, the views of which, are based on fundamental misconceptions of the purpose
of bail and its place in the criminal process, resulting in a conflation of accusation, guilt and
punishment. Other consequences of the review and amendments process recognised in this
article include the denigration of judicial expertise and lack of concern with evidence and
process; the disproportionate influence of the shock jocks, tabloids and Police Association of
NSW on policy formation; the practice of using retired politicians to produce ‘quick fix’
reviews; and the political failure to understand and defend fundamental legal principles that
benefit us all and are central to the maintenance of a democratic society and the rule of law.
The article concludes with some discussion of ways in which media and political debate
might be conducted to produce more balanced outcomes.
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Introduction
In a recent article in the Alternative Law Journal, David Shoebridge MP (2014: 132) stated in
relation to the enactment of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW) (‘the Act’):
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… there is cause for real hope that, come mid‐2014, we will see a new and even
progressive bail regime in place in NSW. This could well be one of those rare
occasions where the law and order debate in NSW has been hijacked by principle
and, for once, the tabloids and shock jocks haven’t even noticed.
Within just five weeks of operation of the new Act these words have unfortunately turned out to
be a case of speaking too soon. The tabloid newspapers and the talk‐back radio shock jocks, far
from ‘not noticing’, led a media campaign which resulted in repudiation of key features of the
new bail legislation. This article will examine how and why this happened and what it means for
the conduct of criminal law reform.
To set the scene, we begin with the backstory, outlining the impetus for bail reform in NSW, as
reflected in the Bail report of the NSW Law Reform Commission (LRC) (2012) and the
subsequent passing of the new Act with the key features of this legislation highlighted. After
little more than one month in operation, however, the new Act was called into question in a
media storm centred on three cases and the NSW Liberal‐National Party Coalition government
initiated a review, presided over by former Labor Party (the main opposing party to the
Coalition in NSW) Attorney General John Hatzistergos. The article then examines the media
triggers for the review, its major findings and the government response in the form of amending
legislation. It examines the merits of the review arguments accepted by the government, in the
light of our detailed analysis of the reported bail decisions1 in the Supreme Court and District
Court of NSW and a selection of unreported decisions2 since the Act came into force. Based on
this analysis, we argue that the review and the amendments are premature, unnecessary, create
complexity and confusion and, quite possibly, will have unintended consequences including the
potential to make finding ‘unacceptable risk’ and thereby refusing bail more difficult. The article
then considers some broader issues apparent in the unfolding of these events. In conclusion, we
consider the question: how might this latest chapter in the history of bail reform have played
out differently? In particular, how might the media and political debate around the ‘notorious’
cases at the heart of the media storm have been differently inflected and contextualised? How
might this important debate have been infused with a stronger commitment to taking seriously
both evidence of various forms, and important legal and democratic principles?
Background
When the Coalition came to power in NSW in 2011, then Attorney General Greg Smith SC took
the laudable step of reforming bail laws. As a former prosecutor with detailed inside knowledge
of the operation of the criminal justice system, Smith was particularly concerned with the way
bail refusal impacted on young people (Gibson 2010) and on 8 June 2011 he gave the NSW LRC
a reference to ‘develop a legislative framework that provides access to bail in appropriate cases’
(NSW LRC 2012: xv).
The need for bail law reform had arisen out of the unwieldy complexity of the Act’s predecessor,
the Bail Act 1978 (NSW). This Act was subject to constant amendments and contained a series of
complex presumptions against bail (NSW LRC 2012: ch 3)3 which led to a soaring remand
population in NSW (25 per cent of all prisoners, which is also the figure nationally) (Brown
2013).4 The new Act was the product of a rigorous law reform process. The NSW LRC, headed by
the highly respected Judge James Wood and retired Supreme Court Judge Hal Sperling, engaged
in a painstaking review over nearly 12 months. The process involved circulation of Questions for
Discussion,5 followed by extensive consultations with all interested parties, including NSW
Police, and the circulation of a preliminary draft for comment. The final Report was then
considered by the Attorney General and his Department and a response was published (NSW
Government 2012), foreshadowing legislation which in part followed the NSW LRC
recommendations. The new Act was passed with the support of all major parties in May 2013.
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The legislation was set aside for 12 months to enable time for significant training, including the
Judicial Commission of NSW’s bail scenarios6 and 26 training sessions run by Legal Aid NSW
across that state.7
The government’s aim was simplicity and clarity:
The Government anticipates that dispensing with the system of presumptions
will not only simplify the bail decision making process, but will also result in
fewer amendments to the legislation enabling it to remain simple and clear, as
was intended when the original bail laws were codified in 1978. (NSW
Government 2012: 7)
Four important features of the new Act designed to enhance these aims are highlighted in the
next section because each came to have greater significance as events unfolded. These are the
removal of the old complexity of presumptions; the introduction of a purposes section;
introduction of a two‐step unacceptable risk model; and the fact that conditions can only be
imposed to mitigate unacceptable risks.
The unacceptable risk model
The most significant feature of the new Act is that it does away with the complexity of the old
presumptions that had plagued the Bail Act 1978 (as discussed above). While the new Act did
not adopt the NSW LRC’s recommendation of an explicit presumption in favour of bail for all
offences, it provides in the purposes section, that a bail authority in making a bail decision is to
have regard to the presumption of innocence and an accused’s general right to be at liberty (s
3(2)). As a matter of statutory construction, when construing a provision of the Act, a
‘construction that would promote’ those purposes is to be ‘preferred to a construction that
would not’: see Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 33.
The Act dramatically simplifies the old regime by making central the model of ‘unacceptable
risk’ (s 17(1)). This model requires a two‐stage assessment. First, a bail authority must consider
whether an accused person poses an unacceptable risk of: failing to appear at any proceedings
for the offence; committing a serious offence; endangering the safety of victims, individuals or
the community; or interfering with witnesses or evidence (s 17(2)(a)‐(d)). In deciding whether
such an unacceptable risk exists the bail authority is to have regard only to the matters set out in
s 17(3) (and 17(4) where relevant). These matters include (in s 17(3)): the accused’s person's
background (a); the nature and seriousness of the offence (b); the strength of the prosecution
case (c); whether the accused person has a history of violence (d); the length of time the accused
person is likely to spend in custody if bail is refused (g); and any special vulnerability or needs
of the accused (j). These criteria are neither novel nor new and are broadly similar to those used
in s 32 of the old Bail Act 1978 regime. If no such ‘unacceptable risks’ exist, bail must be granted
(s 18).
If there are unacceptable risks, the ‘second step’ or assessment must be undertaken with the
bail authority considering whether those risks can be mitigated by imposing conditions. Such
conditions may be requirements as to: conduct (s 25); security (s 26); character
acknowledgements (s 27); accommodation (s 28); pre‐release (s 29); and enforcement (s 30).
Again, such conditions are not new but what is very different is that conditions can now only be
imposed for the purpose of mitigating an unacceptable risk (s 24(1)). Furthermore, such
conditions must be ‘reasonable, proportionate to the offence for which bail is granted, and
appropriate to the unacceptable risk in relation to which they are imposed’ (s 24(3)). This was
specifically designed to target problems with the old Bail Act 1978 where conditions were often
imposed in a pro‐forma way leading to a proliferation of conditions not appropriate to the
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specific alleged offence or offender, leading to extensive breaching and often the arrest of the
offender and the revocation of bail (NSW LRC 2012: 191‐245; Brown 2013).
If conditions can mitigate the unacceptable risk, bail is granted (s 19); only if they cannot will
bail be refused (s 20(1)). (For a useful discussion of the operation of the new regime see also
Sanders 2014.)
The triggers for review
On 20 May 2014 the Act came into operation. Within weeks, three significant decisions to grant
(conditional) bail were made to figures who evoked popular anxiety and anger: on 16 June 2014
to Steven Fesus, accused of murdering his wife 17 years ago (R v Fesus [2014] NSWSC 770); on
16 June to Hassan ‘Sam’ Ibrahim, the former head of the Parramatta chapter of the Nomads
outlaw motorcycle gang charged with selling multiple illegal firearms across western Sydney;
and on 19 June 2014 to Mahmoud Hawi, former President of the Comancheros outlaw
motorcycle gang and charged with the murder of Peter Zervas during a brawl at Sydney Airport
in 2009 (R v Hawi [2014] NSWSC 837). It was a ‘perfect storm’ and the tabloids and shock jocks
wasted no time representing these bail decisions and hence the new Act – and, powerfully, by
extension the Coalition government – as ‘soft on crime’ (Quilter 2014a; Brown 2014).
While the Attorney General initially defended the new Act (Clennell 2014), after only five weeks
in operation the recently appointed NSW Premier Mike Baird8 and his new Attorney General
Brad Hazzard caved in to the media pressure and on 27 June 2014 announced a review of the
new Act by former Labor Party Attorney General Hatzistergos (Baird 2014a). The Terms of
Reference were broadly framed and heavily rhetorical with repeated references to the need to
protect the community (NSW Government 2014). The Premier’s public statements also
expressed a similar preoccupation:
… the Attorney General and I have become concerned that some recent bail
decisions do not reflect the government’s intention to put community safety front
and centre. (Baird 2014a)
Review
On 5 August 2014 Hatzistergos’s Review of the Bail Act 2013 (2014) (herein after the Review
Report), was made public. The Review Report makes 12 recommendations (Hatzistergos 2014:
11‐13). Three are the most significant and the most damaging to the new Act’s regime. In this
section of the paper we offer an analysis of these three recommendations drawing on an
examination of all available reported decisions (ten in total) and a selection of unreported cases.
Presumption of innocence
The first recommendation is to omit the purposes section of the Act (s 3) which includes the
need ‘to have regard to the presumption of innocence and the general right to be at liberty’ (s
3(2)). Instead, the Review Report recommends this be relocated to a ‘preamble’ to the Act which
would also ‘note the importance of bail decisions to community safety’ (Hatzistergos 2014: [11];
Rec 1). The stated reason for this recommendation, is ‘the role played by section 3(2) has been
problematic or at least confusing, particularly in its interaction with section 17(3)’ (Hatzistergos
2014: [96]). The only evidence offered for this alleged confusion is a reference to one
unreported decision and an even vaguer reference to ‘some Local Court determinations’
(Hatzistergos 2014: [96]). Our review of the cases demonstrates there is no confusion over the
inclusion of the ‘presumption of innocence and the general right to liberty’ or that decisions are
giving it undue weight: indeed, the cases often make no mention of s 3(2) or where they do it is
to recognise that this is not a new consideration (Fesus: [8]; Lago: [13]). The cases focus on
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determining ‘unacceptable risk’ in s 17 (Lago: [13]‐[24]; Alexandridis: [33]‐[42]; Rokhzakyi:
[25]‐[56]).
We have not found any case where the role of the presumption of innocence amounts to being
‘problematic or at least confusing’ as asserted in the Review Report at [96]. We have located one
decision where the interaction between the presumption of innocence and s 17 is emphasised, R
v Morris (Unreported, NSWSC, McCallum J, 20 May 2014, as cited in Rodger 2014). This case
involved an Aboriginal woman who was charged with one larceny offence and had been in
custody for two months at the time of the bail application. McCallum J found that Ms Morris’s
background placed her in a category of person with a special vulnerability under the Act in s
17(3)(j) for she:
… came from a background of severe deprivation including her subjection to
violence, sexual abuse and movement between family and foster parents. In
addition, her mother was murdered when she was a teenager and she suffered
from depression together with a number of physical and mental conditions.
(cited in Rodger 2014: 4)
With regard to the relationship between the presumption of innocence and special vulnerability
her Honour stated:
In determining the application, I am required to have regard to the presumption
of innocence and the general right to be at liberty: s 3 of the Act. The weight of
that consideration is reinforced in the present case by relevant evidence of the
applicant's background which, in my assessment, plainly places her in the
category of a person with special vulnerability: cf s 17(3)(j) of the Act. (cited in
Rodgers 2014: 4, emphasis in original)
McCallum J found in relation to any unacceptable risk of committing a serious offence, that Ms
Morris’s criminal history suggested that any offences committed would be relatively minor
(such as shoplifting) and so found no unacceptable risk.
We consider that in no way could such a finding suggest that s 3(2) has been ‘problematic or at
least confusing, particularly in its interaction with section 17(3)’: on the contrary, we would
argue that McCallum J’s assessment was entirely sound.
Unacceptable risk test too complex?
The second significant recommendation is to collapse the two‐stage test for determining
‘unacceptable risk’ into one (Hatzistergos 2014: [14]; Rec 2). The recommended single‐step test
would involve determining unacceptable risk, with an expanded list of risk factors (Hatzistergos
2014: [15]; Recs 3‐4), and by reference also to the bail conditions that might be imposed
(Hatzistergos 2014: [14]; Rec 2). Three reasons underpin this recommendation: the ability to
impose conditions prior to finding ‘unacceptable risk’ (Hatzistergos 2014: [140]); alleged
problems in the application of the unacceptable risk test; and the community finding it hard ‘to
appreciate how an accused who was found to present an “unacceptable risk” can be safely
released, even with strict bail conditions’ (Hatzistergos 2014: [14]).
In relation to the first reason, one case indicates some disquiet about a finding of unacceptable
risk as a pre‐requisite for imposing conditions (Lago: [28]). Aside from this one instance, our
examination of the cases shows no evidence of a problem regarding the imposition of conditions
and more importantly no confusion over the application of the two‐stage unacceptable risk test.
Rather the cases are developing a body of principles regarding ‘unacceptable risk’, albeit the
repository of such cases is in its infancy. In other words, the cases are developing principles for
Online version via www.crimejusticejournal.com
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interpreting the term ‘unacceptable risk’ as it is not further defined in the Act (Lago: [5]). The
cases do have recourse to the decisions in Victoria and Queensland (Hawi: [15]; Lago: [10]‐[12])
(which have similar, although not identical, models9) which remind us that bail is not ‘risk free’
(Hawi: [41]; Alexandridis: [34]) and that a ‘tenuous suspicion’ or ‘fears of the worst possibility’
(Lago: [9]) if an offender is released is not sufficient to constitute ‘unacceptable risk’. Some risk
will always be present given the ‘unpredictability of individual behaviour’ but the evaluation is
whether the risk is unacceptable (Hawi: [41]). A number of judges have quite reasonably made
the observation that bail decisions are inevitably an exercise in prediction and, as Justice Hamill
put it, ‘Bail authorities do not have a crystal ball. They are not soothsayers’ (Alexandridis: [33]).
This is not the product of the 2013 reforms, it has always been thus. Indeed, making predictive
evaluations is not foreign to the courts, this being undertaken in the context of various other
statutory regimes.10
In deciding whether there is an unacceptable risk by reference to the matters in s 17(3), the
cases demonstrate that judges are logically working through the matters. For example, in Hawi,
one of the cases at the heart of the storm that triggered the review, Justice Harrison
methodically worked through each of the s 17(3)(a)‐(l) factors (Hawi: [24]‐[40]).11 By way of
example, we note in relation to s 17(3)(a), Justice Harrison stated:
The Crown accepts that Mr Hawi's background and community ties are in his
favour. This is particularly evident from material tendered on his behalf without
objection in the form of unchallenged affidavits from family members offering to
provide security by way of surety for his release, subject to conditions, if that
were to occur. It appears that Mr Hawi has a stable immediate and extended
family in the area of Sydney where he formerly resided and where his wife and
children continue to live. He has identified offers of employment available to him
within this familial network if he is released. Mr Hawi's criminal history is limited
and not particularly noteworthy. He has a conviction for assault occasioning
actual bodily harm when aged 16 years in 1996. Relevantly in my opinion, he also
has a conviction for affray arising out of the particular events on 22 March 2009.
However, no other aspect of his criminal history reliably informs the assessment
of an unacceptable risk on the present application. (Hawi: [25]‐[26])
Our examination of other cases indicates that the following s 17(3) factors have also featured in
the judgments:







the accused person’s community ties (s 17(3)(a)) may indicate that there is no
‘unacceptable risk’ thereby justifying a grant of bail to a different State (R v Justice
(Unreported, NSWSC, Schimdt J, 28 May 2014, cited in Rodger 2014: 6); see also Hawi:
[25]);
evaluations of the ‘nature and seriousness of the offence’ (s 17(3)(b)), especially if it
involves extreme violence such as murder, may alone be a basis for finding unacceptable
risk (Lago: [15]), however, the ‘nature’ of the offence even if serious may arise from a
relatively unique set of circumstances that are not likely to be replicated, thereby
reducing risk (Rokhzayi: [30]);
emphasis is given to the length of time an accused person will spend in custody before
trial if bail is refused (s 17(3)(g)) particularly where that is likely to be more than a year
(Alexandridis: [11]‐[12]; Lago: [22]; Hawi: [35]‐[36]; Rokhzayi: [35]);
cases deal with assessing the ‘special vulnerability’ (s 17(3)(j)) of the applicant which
may lead to competing conclusions (SK; DK: [14]): the vulnerability giving rise to a need
for care and support (hence favouring bail) whereas it may also give rise to concerns for
the safety of the community (see SK; DK; R v Pratley (Unreported, NSWSC, Campbell J, 4
June 2014), cited in Rodger 2014: 8).
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This brief summary indicates that judicial consideration of the Act is very much in its infancy
with further time needed to appropriately develop the principles, including appellate decisions.
This was envisaged by Parliament, expressly providing for a review ‘to be undertaken as soon as
possible after the period of 3 years’ (s 101(3), emphasis added) – not in less than two months as
has occurred – at which point statistical evidence of how the new Act is operating would also be
available from the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (Weatherburn 2014). What the
cases do not demonstrate, though, is that there are significant problems or confusion with
interpreting the ‘unacceptable risk’ test as the Review Report stated.
Serious offences and show cause
The third and most problematic recommendation is the introduction of categories of ‘serious
offences’ (Hatzistergos 2014: 12; Rec 6) for which an accused person would have to ‘show
cause’ as to why the accused’s detention is not justified (Rec 5). The stated reason for this
recommendation is to ‘provide a useful level of reassurance for the community in relation to
serious offenders whilst also providing a greater level of consistency’ (Hatzistergos 2014:
[220]). The Review Report implies (at [188]‐[191]) that this is required because while bail
decisions in the Supreme Court appropriately weigh the relevant s 17(3) factors (particularly
‘nature and seriousness of the offence’ (s 17(3)(b)) and ‘strength of the prosecution case’ (s
17(3)(c)), the majority of bail decisions are made by police, registrars and magistrates who may
not (Hatzistergos 2014: [191]).
In evaluating this recommendation, it is instructive to return to the three cases mentioned
above that triggered the review and which produced the supposed level of community anxiety
around the new Act. It is important to recall that, when bail was granted in each of these
matters, no judgments or reasons were made public.12 This created a vacuum in which the
media dramatised the idea that the Act was ‘soft on crime’ and the community was potentially at
risk by having such accused persons on bail. Furthermore, with no published reasons, this
meant there was no possible ‘counter‐argument’ to explain the basis for the decisions. This is to
be lamented, particularly as two of the judgments were later made available which provide
detailed reasons as to why conditional bail was granted.13 Thus, the decision in Fesus indicates
that new forensic evidence became available at the bail application that impacted on the
strength of the prosecution case (s 17(3)(c)) and this factor, taken together with the length of
time since offending (17 years), led Adams J to grant conditional bail. Justice Harrison’s
judgment in Hawi sets out (as noted above) the reasoned basis for granting conditional bail.
Hawi’s murder conviction appeal had also been upheld by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal,
with the Chief Justice favouring a complete acquittal and the two majority judges ordering a
retrial.14 Ultimately, Hawi pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of Zervas on 5 September 2014
and bail was not opposed by the Crown (Bibby 2014a), raising serious questions about what
this whole scenario was actually about. In the final matter (Ibrahim), no first instance or appeal
judgment has been made available but the DPP successfully appealed the original decision to
grant bail and on 27 June 2014 bail was revoked by the Supreme Court.
At the heart of media reporting of these cases lies confusion over the purpose of bail which is
not about whether or not an accused person is guilty of an offence. In recent media coverage
and in the way the Government has handled the situation, bail has come to symbolise ‘judgment’
and serve as a proxy for guilt and punishment. Denying bail – putting a person in jail before trial
– has become a way of expressing condemnation of the behaviour in which a person is alleged to
have engaged (Quilter 2014a).
The Government response and the Bail Amendment Act 2014
The same day as the Review Report was made public (5 August 2014), the Premier stated in a
Media Release that the Act would be amended to adopt each of the recommendations (Baird
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2014b). Just over one week later, on 13 August 2014, the Bail Amendment Bill 2014 was read
for a second time. In the Second Reading speech, the Attorney General expressly noted that the
Bill accepts all of the recommendations of the Review Report as they ‘… are common‐sense
changes’ (Hazzard 2014: 9). The Second Reading speech concludes:
The Government acknowledges that the NSW Police Force, courts and legal
practitioners will need some time to digest these changes. Education and training
will be required, along with changes to various information management systems
and bail forms. The Government recognises, however, that the changes proposed
in this bill must be implemented swiftly to ensure that the Bail Act is striking the
right balance in protecting the community and the integrity of the justice system. I
commend the bill to the House. (Hazzard 2014:11; emphasis added)
While the Government’s Amendment Bill suggests an urgent need to ensure the Act is striking
the right balance, the evidence (as discussed above) suggests otherwise. But the Government
may get more than it bargained for with some unintended effects of the amending provisions
discussed below.
The Amendment Bill was passed by Parliament on 17 September 2014 and, at the time of
publication of this article, was yet to commence operation. There are three main points to make
about the Bail Amendment Act 2014.
First, the reference to the presumption of innocence which had been in the purposes section of
the Act has been relocated to the Preamble along with statements regarding: the need to ensure
the safety of victims, individuals and the community (a); and need to ensure the integrity of the
justice system (b). Resort to a preamble is old fashioned and has generally been discontinued
(Pearce & Geddes 2011: [1.32]). The clear purpose is to reduce the importance of a bail
authority having regard to the presumption of innocence – a regard that has not featured
strongly in the cases analysed – with the assumption that a preamble is not usually construed as
part of the Act.15 If this construction is upheld by the courts, a cornerstone of our criminal
justice system – the presumption of innocence – is significantly downgraded. Ironically, given
the rhetoric around the asserted need for the 2014 amendments, the legislation’s expression of
principles regarding community safety has also been consigned to the relatively innocuous
location of the preamble.
Secondly, s 17 introduces a new concept of ‘bail concern’ not otherwise known to bail law in
NSW or any other Australian jurisdiction, and certainly not in the equivalent
Victorian/Queensland unacceptable risk models. Thus, the amending provisions require a bail
authority to assess any ‘bail concerns’ before making a bail decision (s 17(1)). A ‘bail concern’ is
one that relates to the former factors used to assess ‘unacceptable risks’ in s 17(2) (failing to
appear; commit a serious offence; endanger safety of victims, individuals or the community; or
interfere with witnesses). In assessing the ‘bail concern’ the bail authority must take into
account only the matters in s 18, which is comprised of an expanded list16 of the matters
previously used to assess unacceptable risk in s 17(3). Importantly, these factors now also
include any bail conditions that could reasonably be imposed to address any bail concerns (s
18(1)(p)) whereas previously such conditions could only be imposed to mitigate an
‘unacceptable risk’. The clear intent is to allow bail conditions to be imposed at the lower
threshold of a ‘bail concern’: that is, even if no ‘unacceptable risk’ is identified. This is in direct
conflict with the NSW LRC Report on Bail (discussed above) which attempted to restrict the
proliferation of pro‐forma bail conditions and conduct requirements (see NSW LRC 2012: 191‐
245; Brown 2014) by making it a two‐step process so that conditions only came into play where
the person would otherwise be detained, or as provided in the legislation, where there had been
an unacceptable risk finding.
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While this may be the intended effect, introducing a concept not otherwise known to Australian
bail laws may also have unintended consequences. In particular, the ‘unacceptable risk’
assessment in s 19 still requires a ‘second step’ before bail can be refused and so the two steps
are not fully collapsed. More importantly, the concept of ‘unacceptable risk’ seems to become a
‘free floating’ one attached now only to the factors in s 19(2)(a)‐(d) (failing to appear; commit a
serious offence; endanger the safety of victims, individuals or the community; or interfere with
witnesses) but not by reference to the s 18 matters.17 While s 19(1) indicates that a bail
authority is to refuse bail if satisfied, ‘on the basis of an assessment of bail concerns under this
Division, that there is an unacceptable risk’, it is difficult to marry s 19(1) with s 19(2). Thus,
what is it about the ‘assessment of bail concerns under this Division’ that can raise it from a
mere ‘bail concern’ to an ‘unacceptable risk’ when a ‘concern’ is clearly a lower threshold which
may not even amount to a ‘risk’ let alone an ‘unacceptable’ one. Ironically, this could also have
the other unintended consequence of making bail refusal more difficult since it is now unclear
how the bail authority moves from an assessment of ‘bail concerns’ in s 18 to the higher
threshold of ‘unacceptable risk’: that is, a bail concern is not even a ‘risk’ let alone an
‘unacceptable’ one.
If the Government was genuinely concerned that the two‐step unacceptable risk regime in the
original 2013 Act was causing confusion, it is surprising that they have now introduced what is
in effect another layer of assessment and prediction, using the language of ‘bail concern’.
Finally, an additional layer of complexity has been added by the ‘show cause’ provision in s 16A,
which returns us squarely to the old territory of the complexities of presumptions against bail in
the former Bail Act 1978 (discussed above). While the Review Report argues for a distinction
between a show cause test to offence‐based ‘presumptions’ at [222], the distinction is poorly
explained and appears to be one of semantics:
The show cause test is different to the previous offence‐based presumptions in
the 1978 Act. Offence‐based presumptions indicate the bail outcome that an
accused is expected to receive. Where an accused cannot rebut the presumption,
the presumption has operative force. This does not work within an unacceptable
risk model. The show cause requirement is part of a process to reach the end
decision which includes the risk assessment. (At [222], emphasis in original)
Indeed, it will be difficult to explain to a person accused of a ‘show cause’ offence how this does
not determine the bail outcome given the restrictive reasons for showing cause (discussed
below).18 Furthermore, as the NSW LRC Report made clear:
… the scheme of presumptions, exceptions, and exceptional circumstances … is an
unwarranted imposition on the discretion of police and the courts. … It is
voluminous, unwieldy, hugely complex and involves too blunt an approach. The
results are frequently anomalous and unjust. (NSW LRC 2012: 123)
Moreover an accused’s inclusion within a particular ‘category’ of serious offence tells us next to
nothing about his/her risk factors in relation to: non‐appearance; committing a serious offence
whilst on bail; interfering with evidence; or endangering the safety of victims or the community.
The show cause test, is further problematic because, while it clarifies that if a person shows
cause the unacceptable risk test must still be applied prior to bail being granted (the
Queensland/Victorian provisions were equivocal19), it may complicate the operation of the
‘unacceptable risk’ test further. Section 19(3) provides that where a person has shown that
detention is not justified this ‘is not relevant to the determination of whether or not there is an
unacceptable risk’. The Queensland and Victorian cases suggest that an accused may show
cause, for instance, on the basis of the strength/weakness of the prosecution case, excessive
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preventable delays and an accused’s special medical condition.20 In the event that the accused
does ‘show cause’ and the bail authority turns to the unacceptable risk assessment, does s 19(3)
mean that the factors taken into account for showing cause cannot be re‐assessed for the
making of a bail decision of ‘unacceptable risk’? If that is so, this would be particularly
problematic given that, when assessing the factors in s 18, specific reference to matters that
may be used to ‘show cause’ are included (for example s 18(1)(c) (strength of the prosecution
case), (h) the length of time the accused person is likely to spend in custody if bail is refused and
(k) (special vulnerability/needs)).21
While the Government has claimed that the changes are ‘common sense’, in its determination to
look ‘tougher’ on crime and to give the electorate the impression that more people will be
denied bail, they have rashly introduced complicated and unnecessary changes to a regime that
had only just begun to become familiar to police, lawyers, magistrates and judges after a twelve
month familiarisation and training period. It is unclear what status the emerging body of legal
principles under the Act discussed in this article will now have. Indeed, will magistrates and
judges yet again need to start from scratch? And clearly, the Attorney General has already
indicated (see second reading speech cited above) that further training and education and time‐
lag may well be needed to accommodate these amendments. What a mess!
Broader issues in the bail reform reversal
What are we to make more generally of the sudden media‐driven reversal of bail reform
outlined above? Do we just add it to the list as yet another example of the irrationality of public
policy making? We suggest there are some wider features that go beyond the specific instance
that are worth highlighting in the context of an outbreak of regressive criminal justice
legislation in a range of jurisdictions, not least in Queensland, Victoria and NSW. These features
include: the denigration of judicial expertise and lack of concern with evidence and process; the
power of the ‘shock jocks’, tabloids and police; and political failure to understand and defend
fundamental legal principles that benefit us all and are central to the maintenance of a
democratic society and the rule of law (Brown 2014).
The denigration of judicial expertise and lack of concern with evidence and process
A common feature is the denigration of judicial expertise and a lack of concern with evidence. In
contrast to the NSW LRC Report and process, the Review Report involved little or no new
research. Its arguments do not arise out of empirical analysis nor, as analysed above, was there
evidence, after one month’s operation, of any judicial concern over the interpretation of the Act.
What is the point in investing time and expense in the extensive consultative inquiries if the
results, having been scrutinised by the Attorney General’s Department, reduced to legislation
and subjected to one year’s training for all who will administer it, can be overturned by a short
term political process before the new Act has been in operation long enough to be evaluated?
What message does this send about political regard for judicial expertise?
The events also highlight impatience with and lack of faith in legal processes and the ability of
the system to correct error. The first recourse in response to arguments that a decision is wrong
is to take it on appeal, not change the law. In recent years a feature of attacks on the judiciary as
‘out of touch’ and ‘not reflecting community values’ has been lack of preparedness to take
contested cases on appeal or, where they are taken on appeal, to wait for the results before
changing the law. A clear example was the introduction of the NSW ‘one punch’ law in response
to the media and public outcry over the sentence handed down in 2013 to Kieran Loveridge for
the manslaughter of Thomas Kelly (Quilter 2014b), even though the DPP had announced an
intention to appeal the sentence. Legislation to introduce a new ‘assault causing death’ offence
was rushed through Parliament in January 2014 (Quilter 2014b). In May 2014 the NSW Court of
Criminal Appeal handed down its decision on the DPP’s appeal against sentence, articulating the
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relevant sentencing principles and finding manifest inadequacy in the sentence which was, as a
result, significantly increased (Loveridge [2014] NSWCCA 120). In addition, the opportunity for
a more nuanced guideline judgment was lost as the DPP had to withdraw his guideline
judgment application in the Loveridge appeal in light of the introduction of the new ‘one punch’
law.
It is easier for the Police Association of NSW (the NSW police union) to complain to the Daily
Telegraph or selected shock jocks and initiate a media campaign than request the DPP to go
through the normal criminal justice processes. During his campaign against the bail laws Ray
Hadley, a high rating radio ‘shock jock’, ‘claimed on his 2GB radio program to have received 400
emails from serving police officers complaining about magistrates decisions’ (Olding 2014).
Such recourse to the media often produces quicker results than reliance on legal processes, as
politicians, unprepared to argue for principles or await established legal processes, rush to
change laws in response to media criticism. In this way the level of public trust in the judiciary
and the criminal justice system is constantly eroded, to the long‐term detriment of legal
integrity (Hindess and Sawyer 2004).22 This process feeds into an increasingly uncivil public
discourse. Instant experts abound. People who would not think of looking over the shoulder of,
say, their electrician, plumber or mechanic, seem to think judicial decisions can be second
guessed by anyone, irrespective of their (lack of) knowledge of all the specific facts or evidence
(Ryan 2005; Loader 2006; Garland 2001).23
Another feature of these events is the growing practice of using former politicians to produce
quick ‘reviews’ of complex legislation, often in preference to considered judicial and other
extensive reports (Tink and Wheelan 2013).24 Such reviews lack the element of independence,
the depth of research and reliance on evidence, and the time for widespread consultation among
interested parties, that are characteristic of law reform and other inquiries. They are ‘in‐house’
political exercises designed to produce a way for politicians to go through the appearances of
consultation while securing the quick results they want so as to alleviate media and public
pressure (Sentas and Cowdery 2013).
As the former Attorney General who presided over more ‘punitive’ amendments (Steel 2009) to
the reformist Bail Act 1978 than any other, turning bail from a release mechanism that
respected the presumption of innocence and the right to liberty into a mechanism for pre‐trial
punishment, Hatzistergos was possibly the most inappropriate person imaginable to carry out
the review. It was precisely the process of constant undermining of the presumption in favour of
bail which he championed, that led to the complexity and incoherence of the 1978 Act and to the
reference to the NSW LRC to remedy it. Hatzistergos’s hard‐line position could not have been
clearer than when he introduced the Bail Amendment Bill 2007, boasting that ‘New South Wales
now has the toughest bail laws in Australia’. He noted that:
… part of those changes includes removing the presumption in favour of bail for a
large number of crimes and introducing presumptions against bail for crimes
including drug importation, firearm offences, repeat property offences, and riots,
and an even more demanding exceptional circumstances test for murder and
serious personal violence, including sexual assault.
Those types of offenders now have a much tougher time being granted bail under
our rigorous system. These extensive changes have delivered results. There is no
doubt that the inmate population, particularly those on remand, has risen
considerably as a result of the changes. In fact the number of remand prisoners
has increased by 20 per cent in the last three years alone and new jails are being
opened to accommodate the increase. (Hatzistergos 2007, emphasis added)
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In short, access to bail should be heavily restricted for ‘those types of offenders’, referring to
accused people who have not yet had their guilt determined by a court, a classic conflation of
accusation and guilt which lies at the heart of the media and political responses outlined above.
A similar nonchalance towards the presumption of innocence was shown more recently by NSW
Attorney General Brad Hazzard appointed to this position in April 2014. Speaking about the
shifting of the onus to defendants to prove that they should be granted bail under the
amendments, he stated: ‘I have no doubt that needed to be changed, and they [defendants] now
have to convince the court on behalf of the community they should be allowed out, and I don’t
really see that as a big deal.’ (Huntsdale 2014, emphasis added) If Attorneys General cannot
respect the presumption of innocence and the role of bail in protecting the value of liberty, how
are we to expect shock jocks and tabloid journalists to do so? And is an explosion in the remand
population and the hugely expensive building of new prisons seriously suggested to be the
primary indicator of successful criminal justice policy, especially in relation to the unconvicted?
Finally, the complete lack of concern with evidence for the change is in contrast to the constant
political parroting of the need for ‘evidence driven policy’. Here a reform based on years of
intensive and expert consideration was sabotaged before it had had time to operate long enough
to be evaluated. Why not wait to see how it was working? The answer can only be that the main
concern was not with the evidence, the reality, but with the political imperative of appearing to
placate the shock jocks and the Police Association of NSW in order to diminish media criticism
of the government.
The power of the shock jocks, tabloids and Police Association
A further feature of the bail reform reversal is the power of the shock jocks (Mickler 2004) and
the tabloids (Scalmer and Goot 2004), in this case Ray Hadley in particular. Hadley’s animosity
towards former Attorney General Smith was played out in the debate prior to the release of the
NSW LRC Report as part of a pre‐emptive attack on the Report, commenced even before the
Commission’s final recommendations had been settled. On one front page of the Daily Telegraph
Greg Smith was pictured as turning from Rambo to a marshmallow, accompanied by a banner
headline ‘How DPP Greg Smith went from Rambo to cream puff with stance of sentencing in
NSW’ (Clennell 2012). This undermining of Greg Smith for not being tough enough on law and
order was ultimately successful with Smith being removed from the portfolio.
Smith’s former media advisor, legal journalist Michael Pelly, has noted that Smith’s attempts to
reform bail and sentencing and bring the prison population down was initially popular within
the government, particularly on financial grounds, until pressure was applied. According to
Pelly, ‘the pressure came largely from one source: 2GB [radio] Ray Hadley’:
Ray has very solid links to the police and has a particular view about law and
order policy, and his voice is extremely influential.
Each parliamentary office … has a radio selection. And I can assure you that from
9 o’clock to 12 o’clock, I’d say 80 per cent of parliamentarians had Ray Hadley on
the radio and had Ray Hadley telling them for a good four months that Greg Smith
was soft on crime, was a raving lunatic, that Barry O’Farrell should sack him.
(Quoted in Arnold 2014)
At the time Smith was removed, the Attorney General’s Department was subsumed into a newly
named Police and Justice Department. The result of this was that, for the first time in NSW
history, the Attorney General was junior in status to the Police Minister. In Premier Baird’s April
2014 ministerial appointments, this was Mike Gallacher, who was subsequently forced to resign
as Police Minister over corruption allegations raised at the Independent Commission Against
Corruption (Whitbourn et al. 2014). The Attorney General has, by constitutional convention, a
special role as first law officer: broadly put, to protect the integrity of legal processes (Heraghty
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2002). Following criticism, the Baird‐appointed Attorney General, Brad Hazzard, was upgraded
by being named head of the Police and Justice Department; shortly thereafter (late June 2014)
the Department’s name was re‐changed for a second time within two months to ‘Department of
Justice’ (Needham 2014).
The initial downgrading of the position of the Attorney General vis‐a‐vis the Police Minister is
another illustration of the power and influence wielded by the Police Association of NSW.
Gallacher was a former President of this organisation. Increasingly, NSW government responses
to significant criminal justice issues have been driven by the Police Minister, and indirectly the
Police Association, rather than the Attorney General. This came to a head in outbursts from
Barry O’Farrell who claimed that the judiciary were ‘out of touch’ after one bail decision (Davies
and Patty 2012) and again over the Thomas Kelly ‘one punch’ case where he called for more
judges and magistrates to be selected from the police because the police were more in touch
with community values. The Police Association sees its role not simply as protecting the
industrial interests of its members but also in securing the widest possible police powers,
irrespective of whether that is desirable in the broader public interest of maintaining
democratic traditions of liberties and rights (Sentas and Cowdery 2013).
This is not a new development. Mark Finnane has traced the history of police union political
power back to the 1920s, noting that ‘the annual conferences of police unions in Australia have
been a standing item in the diaries of ministers responsible for police, their shadows in
opposition, and occasionally even a premier’ (Finnane 2000: 5). Notable examples of political
interventions occurred in NSW by way of selective non‐enforcement of public order offences as
part of a campaign against the repeal of the Summary Offences Act 1970 (NSW) (Egger and
Findlay 1988), in Queensland in the wake of the Fitzgerald Inquiry (1989) and in the role the
Police Association of Victoria played in bringing down three Police Commissioners: Comrie,
Nixon and Overland (Bachelard and Munro 2011). Finnane (2000: 17) concluded that ‘police
unions by the end of the twentieth century had become major players in the organisation of
criminal justice in Australia.’ What is perhaps new is his suggestion that ‘the media became at
some point a captive of police union viewpoints – at what point and to what degree would await
further research’ (Finnane 2000: 16).
The political failure to defend rule of law principles
Another feature of the events is the fickleness of politicians and their inability to stand up for
principles. Amongst various rule of law principles are that citizens should have a right to
personal liberty, enjoy a presumption of innocence and not suffer punishment without
conviction after due process (NSW LRC 2012: ch 2). Detention before trial offends these
principles and so it should be strictly limited. The laws relating to bail should ensure this, by
providing that bail can only be denied if it is likely that the accused person will abscond, attempt
to interfere with witnesses or, with the integrity of justice processes, threaten to harm the
victim, individuals or the community, or commit further serious offences. These decisions are
best made, in the first instance, by police and then, on review, by the judiciary, on the basis of
evidence particular to the specific case and the individual circumstances. A person accused of
homicide in relation to a mercy killing of a partner suffering long‐term crippling pain should
probably be released on bail pending the trial; an accused serial or contract killer should not.
This is a matter for judicial discretion, not for politicians to decide in advance through creating
complex categories of offence based presumptions which cut across the ability to assess the
individual merits of cases. Are these principles too difficult for politicians to comprehend and
defend?
A common mistake is to frame rule of law principles as individual interests, to be balanced
against public or social interests. This error was noted by Judge Cross in R v Wakefield.25
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The error lies in seeing the interest in liberty, and indeed in the other
fundamental principles of the law, such as the presumption of innocence and the
right to a fair trial, as interests of the individual and in particular the individual
defendant. Conceiving them in this way, within the familiar metaphor of balance,
renders one far more likely to see them as of less weight than social, community
and public interests. [But] the interest in liberty and fundamental principles is
correctly seen as a collective, social, public interest. The issue then is one of
reconciling or evaluating the strength of competing public interests. (NSW LRC
2012: para 3.12; Brown, 2013: 87, emphasis in original)
Finally, the NSW bail reform reversal offends two other important legal principles, those of
generality and of reciprocity. Laws should be made after careful consideration in relation to
general states of affairs, not in relation to individual cases. Constantly changing the law after
media outcries over particular cases offends the principle of generality and produces distortions
in the law for short‐term political gain. The principle of reciprocity is a form of social glue
fundamental to a safe and cohesive society. It requires that we should want the same laws and
legal processes applied to others that we would wish to be in operation in relation to ourselves,
our families and our friends. Shock jocks and journalists might usefully reflect on this principle.
Being otherwise?
The rather depressing state of affairs outlined in this article raises the question of how might it
have been otherwise? Russell Hogg (2013) has suggested that populism should be taken more
seriously as a political rationality and that the common characterisation of penal populism as a
form of pathology or irrationalism is politically unproductive. He further suggests that the two
terms should be uncoupled, paving the way for an attempt to take populism more seriously and
open up spaces for the mobilisation of more progressive forms of populism. We have not
utilised the notion of penal populism directly in this article but certainly an underlying theme
has been the sheer irrationality of the events and processes we have outlined, as an exercise in
law reform. A possible example of a more progressive populist response leading to non‐punitive
law reform may be found in the initial responses to the death from one punch of Thomas Kelly
in July 2012, Kings Cross, Sydney. In this instance, Quilter (2014c) noted that community and
government responses focussed on a broad range of regulatory conditions and a multi‐faceted
response to address alcohol‐related violence rather than simply on the individual culpability of
the offender. But, as with Shoebridge’s (2014) comments on bail reform quoted at the outset of
this article, this also turned out to be a case of ‘speaking too soon’. The political response to the
sentence originally given to Thomas Kelly’s killer, Kieran Loveridge, turned suddenly in the
direction of a new ‘one punch law’, replete with a mandatory sentencing regime, which was
subsequently adopted in different forms in Victoria and Queensland.26 Indeed, there seems little
that is progressive in the recent rash of law and order politics and legislation across a number of
Australian jurisdictions. Nevertheless, in the spirit of Hogg’s suggestion, we will conclude this
article with some thoughts and questions on how events might have unfolded otherwise.
The centrepiece of our critique has been the appeal to evidence as a requirement for considered
public policy making and certainly for any sudden about‐turns. As argued above, statistical
evidence as to how the new Act was working was not yet available and our analysis of the case
law evidence revealed no major problems in interpretation of the Act. In the absence of such
evidence, two major arguments were mounted. First, the Review Report pitched its objections
to the new legislation at the level of policy disagreement, claiming that ‘the review has not been
hampered by this lack of data, as it focuses on the underlying policy of the Act’ (Hatzistergos
2014: [46]). The policy disagreement is that ‘on no basis could the presumption of innocence as
referenced in section 3(2) be regarded as a purpose of the Act’ (Hatzistergos 2014: [103]). This
amounted to a repudiation (by simple assertion) of the more detailed and careful arguments in
the NSW LRC Report (NSW LRC 2012: Ch 2) previously accepted by the Government and the
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Parliament. Secondly, the new Attorney General, Brad Hazzard, in the absence of evidence to
support the Government’s position, fell back on that old favourite, ‘common sense’; the Review
Report recommendations were merely ‘common sense changes’ (Hazzard 2014: 9). Law and
order ‘commonsense’ has a long pedigree. As argued by Hogg and Brown (1998: 19):
Commonsense is partial rather than wrong. By its very nature it resists
engagement with other, more systematic bodies of knowledge where these resist
commonsense assumptions. Commonsense is what ‘we all know’ already. It
embodies tacit judgments and assumptions about the world that are harboured
prior to the evidence being gathered. This is what makes it so resistant to debate
or dialogue which questions, rather than shares, its starting points.
Hogg and Brown (1998: 21‐41) identify a number of ‘enduring themes’ within law and order
‘commonsense’: soaring crimes rates; ‘it’s worse than ever’ (law and order nostalgia); US
comparisons (the shape of things to come); soft on crime (the criminal justice does not protect
citizens); ‘we need more police with greater powers’; ‘we need tougher penalties’; and victims
should be able to get revenge through the courts. They go on to argue that there is an ‘uncivil’
side to law and order commonsense and that it is to ‘the fallibility of the system and the
importance of not committing further crimes in the name of justice, punishment, sacrifice or
vengeance, that criminal justice policy should be directed in a civil society’ (Hogg and Brown
2014: 43).
Appeals to evidence, rationality and process, while central to our analysis above and, hopefully,
to considered criminal justice public policy making (Hobbs and Hamerton 2014), must also be
translated into and through the forms of argument and the register of popular media and
politics, a realm in which emotion and affect play key roles. Criminal justice issues arouse strong
emotions and lend themselves to a more individualised focus than other types of news stories.
The focus is often on the victim, the language is emotive, constructing a virtual community
around identification with particular high profile victims and a sense of cohesion that flows
from widespread condemnation of the alleged offender (Quilter 2014c). ‘Legal niceties’ are
often seen as just that, a formalistic overlay which does not reflect or give expression to the
personal narratives of hurt, loss, outrage and revenge that swirl around specific crimes.
While bail decision‐making is a procedural stage in the process of bringing someone to trial so
that their culpability can be decided, it has increasingly become, as we argued earlier, a forum
for the condemnation of the accused and of their alleged behaviour, a moment where
accusation, guilt and punishment are conflated. The passage of the Act was an attempt to shift
bail from a form of pre‐trial preventive detention and return it to its place as a procedural forum
focussed not on the nature of the alleged offence but largely on whether the defendant would
present for trial and respect the integrity of the trial process, the evidence, witnesses, victims
and the community. The media outrage over the three specific bail decisions was focussed
rather on the nature of the alleged offences (in two cases, homicide), the gang affiliations of
Mick Hawi and Hassan Ibrahim, and the views of relatives of a murder victim.27
Earlier we noted the vacuum that occurred in the aftermath of the three contentious bail
decisions, during which talk‐back radio and the Daily Telegraph28 were able to portray the
decisions as putting the public at risk, doing a disservice to the victims and their relatives, and
indicating the new Act and the government were ‘soft on crime’. We noted that, without
published reasons for the decisions being made available, the opportunity to mount counter
arguments to the ‘outrage’ line was restricted. When the decisions did become available, after
the damage had been done, they seemed cogent and explicable in two of the cases and in the
other, an appeal was successful. If courts made decisions available more quickly, commentators
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would be better placed to respond and it is possible the public ‘debate’, such as it is, would be
better informed and more nuanced.
Another question worth some consideration is how both politicians and the media might be
brought into some engagement with the law reform process in ways that makes them better
informed and more responsible? How was it possible for a Parliament that unanimously
approved and passed the new Act in May 2013, giving its imprimatur to the long law reform
process, to perform such an about turn a year later and repudiate the key features of the
legislation, on precious little evidence save some media uproar over a small number of cases?
What does this say about the level of commitment to legislative integrity and responsibility,
about the quality of information provided to parliamentarians, about their comprehension of
the arguments for reform, and about their ability to articulate and defend key principles central
to the protection of legal processes and liberties in a democratic society? What does it say about
the way party whip and caucus systems operate and about the quality of leadership, of both
government and opposition? Are there better Committee processes that might have been used
to provide some greater scrutiny to the Review Report arguments?
The Parliament of NSW Legislative Review Committee commented on the Bail Amendment Bill
that: ‘In removing a requirement that the bail authority gives regard to the presumption of
innocence and the general right of liberty when making bail decisions, the Bill impacts these
rights. The Committee refers these matters to Parliament for further consideration.’ (Legislation
Review Committee 2014: vii) This referral to the parliament appears to have been ignored.
Why? What exactly would have been wrong with referring the report to a parliamentary
standing committee for further consideration, as proposed by the Australian Greens party? Why
did the Australian Labor Party (ALP) opposition roundly criticise the Amendment Bill and yet
still vote for it (Whitbourn 2014)? Shadow Attorney General Paul Lynch said in debate: ‘The
Opposition does not oppose the bill but it thinks the Government has not the slightest idea what
it is doing’ (Lynch 2014: 6). ALP MP Ron Hoenig echoed the refrain: ‘the Opposition does not
oppose this convoluted, dreadful bill, but it is bad public policy created by a panicked
Government trying to curry favour with a reactionary media’ (Hoenig 2014: 9). As Mr Jamie
Parker, Australian Greens MP for Balmain noted: ‘Opposition members have made some
incredibly strong arguments as to why the bill is faulty, poorly developed and attacks
fundamental rights, why it waters down the bedrock of our justice system – the presumption of
innocence – and trashes judicial expertise, yet the Opposition essentially will be waving the bill
through’ (Parker 2014: 11). Why? As Mr Parker went on to point out: ‘If Labor were to oppose
this bill it would present us with an opportunity to conduct further negotiations to improve the
bill as it stands’ (Parker 2014: 12).
What do we make of the fact that the man asked to complete a hasty review of the Act had, in
2009, while Attorney General, in the then ALP government, rejected the overtures of the then
Opposition (Coalition) Shadow Attorney General, Smith, to develop a bi‐partisan, evidence
driven, fairer, and less costly criminal justice policy, taking criminal justice out of the law and
order auction (West 2009). How might the business of criminal justice policy making and law
reform have been different if Smith’s offer of a ‘truce’ had been accepted, rather than rejected
(Robins 2009)? These questions deserve reflection, for the attempt to formulate answers might
illuminate paths to a different process and a different outcome, challenging the notion that the
sabotage of bail reform in NSW was somehow inevitable.
In relation to the law reform process itself it is evident that the existing extensive consultative
exercise engaged in by the NSW LRC does not preclude certain parties from leaking to the media
prior to the finalisation of the final report, nor from continuing to try to undermine
recommendations they do not agree with once the report is released. In short, the consultation
process does not seem to generate a sense of commitment to the various compromise positions
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inevitably reflected in a final report and in subsequent legislation. This raises the question of
whether different forms of consultative process might produce a more collective outcome.
Might a ‘workshop’ approach built around selected scenarios, as later developed by the NSW
Sentencing Commission,29 work better to focus discussion, highlight the empirical evidence and
the various arguments, and generate a wider community consensus around compromise
recommendations?
To push such thinking even further, might it be possible for sections of the media to be invited
to put forward submissions to law reform bodies and processes or to be somehow involved in
the deliberative process? Such a suggestion sounds a bit farfetched, but certain media
commentators clearly have very strong views on how particular legal processes ought to
operate and it might be of benefit if those views were able to be articulated in a general way,
divorced from specific cases, and in an environment that encouraged them to be constructive. If
the Ray Hadleys and Daily Telegraph editors of the world could somehow be given a voice
during the official process of law reform policy formulation, the very process of engagement and
of having to come to terms with some of the underlying principles and alternative arguments
might make them a little less inclined to try to trump or undermine the results down the track,
results in which they, as outsiders to the law reform consultation process, have no stake.
Another challenge to be confronted is how to generate good news stories in a media climate that
thrives on highlighting dysfunction and failure. The outcome of the Greg Smith‐initiated bail law
reform process might have been covered in a very different way. With 25 per cent of the NSW
prison population unconvicted at the time, between 2500 and 3000 people at any one time and
more than 10,000 over the course of a year in NSW (72.4 per cent of total prison receptions in
2010: NSW LRC 2012: [4.6]), the system was ripe for reform. Not only is the system extremely
costly in monetary terms, its social consequences are profoundly dysfunctional. They include:
physical and psychological hardship; assaults and deaths in custody; financial implications for
the accused and their family; deleterious effects on children; the criminogenic effect of mixing
with sentenced prisoners and high risk remandees; the lack of access to any programs; a range
of effects on the ability to receive a fair trial, and on conviction rates; pressure to plead guilty;
and others (see NSW LRC: Ch 5; Grunseit et al. 2008).
The enactment of the Act was potentially a good news story: more people would be granted bail;
prison numbers would be reduced; considerable financial savings would be achieved;
Corrective Services would be freed up from processing so many people received into prison on
remand for minor offences, enabling them to concentrate resources on programs for the
convicted; better justice would be achieved for the 55 per cent of those on remand (5,218 of
10,342) who in 2010 in NSW were subsequently released to bail, received a non‐custodial
sentence or were acquitted (NSW LRC 2012: [4.13]); fewer lives would be disrupted; the
criminogenic (crime producing) effect of being sent to prison would be reduced; and so on.
It is our understanding that at least one journalist was researching a story along these lines to
coincide with the new Act coming into operation but decided not to go ahead. It would have
been timely to produce a follow up story to the one written by Joel Gibson in the Sydney Morning
Herald in 2010 under the headline ‘No Bail Go to Jail’, which focussed on the bashing of a
subsequently acquitted remand prisoner, and which was a vehicle for explaining Greg Smith’s
reformist agenda (Gibson 2010). Journalistic traditions of ‘more bad news’ tend to gel with a
widespread political reluctance to argue for progressive change. This is a version of ‘don’t
mention the war’; or, in this case, don’t mention that the government might be doing something
other than taking a ‘tough’ (read punitive) stand on crime and punishment. Governments of all
persuasions are happy to trumpet an increase in penalties but often prefer to remain silent
about programs or initiatives which attempt to reduce imprisonment rates, provide
rehabilitative programs or post release assistance, as if they are embarrassed by sound and
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constructive reform outcomes, or fear that they may be an electoral risk for being insufficiently
draconian. These attitudes have led to the entrenching of a ‘reform on the sly’ approach,
whereby more progressive social and welfare approaches to criminal justice issues, however
much evidence can be marshalled in their favour and however successful, are not promoted lest
they draw adverse attention and claims of being ‘soft on crime’, the automatic assumption being
that the public are universally punitive, a ‘common sense’ notion challenged by research
(Roberts et al. 2003). One effect of this approach is that little on‐going public support is built for
reformist measures. So when the spotlight is shone on a sound and carefully constructed reform
initiative like the Act, and media and political criticisms emerge, there is little well informed and
widespread public support to point out that, despite the specific ‘weakness’ that has been
identified, the initiative is meritorious and beneficial (and at the very least, worth being allowed
to ‘bed down’ before judgment is passed on it). Because the discursive ground for this sort of
insulating strategy has not been prepared, punitive and exclusionary responses quickly swamp
the field.
Unfortunately, this was the unfavourable environment into which the work of the NSW LRC and
Greg Smith’s bail reform legislation emerged. The fact that the legislation’s aims were eminently
sensible – making bail easier to obtain would both alleviate the injustice of pre‐trial detention
for many accused and reduce the remand population in NSW prisons – was lost amidst the
shouting and the fear‐mongering. The ease and rapidity with which these laudable goals of the
new Act came to be characterised as undesirable and dangerous, effects ‘proved’ by the
outcomes in three contentious cases, is troubling. Conspiratorial theories were floated including
the suggestion that any increase in the proportion of accused persons being granted bail
(characterised in the media as a ‘bad’ thing) could be attributable to deliberate manipulation by
the NSW Police, as part of a strategy to undermine the new Act (Olding 2014). Police Association
President Scott Weber countered that it was ‘the judiciary not enforcing the community
standards’ that was the reason for any increase in the success rate of bail applications (Olding
2014). Could it be that if bail rates do increase and the remand population shrinks (it is far too
soon to tell), that neither police sabotage nor judges being ‘out of touch’ is the cause? Might it
simply be that police, magistrates and judges are simply carrying out the intentions behind, and
applying the principles in, the Act?30
Worthwhile law reform takes time. It requires ongoing political commitment, constant
justification and community and media engagement. It involves restatement of the underlying
principles governing the criminal justice system, full recourse to the available evidence, and
recognition that sound and effective reform cannot be done ‘on the sly’ if it is to command wide
respect and be resilient in the face of anticipated attacks. Rather than ‘speaking too soon’ the
key problem may be not speaking soon and not often enough.
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NSWLRC 2012: ch 3, esp 28‐42.
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(Brown 2013).Currently 3 in 10 NSW prisoners are on remand.
NSW Law Reform Commission, Questions for Discussion, June. The questions built in part on an earlier review in
2010 (Criminal Law Review Division 2010).
6 Judicial Commission The Bail Act 2013: Selected Scenarios accessible at
http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/education‐dvds/the‐bail‐act‐2013‐selected‐scenarios Also note that
the Judicial Commission sent DVD copies of these scenarios to law schools across NSW.
7 For an indication of the breadth of seminars hosted by Legal Aid NSW, see Bail Act 2013 Training accessible at
http://www.legalaid.nsw.gov.au/for‐lawyers/professional‐development/bail‐act‐2013‐training
8 It should be noted that Baird had only recently become Premier on 17 April 2014 following Barry O’Farrell’s
resignation as Premier for misleading the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption. It is possible that
with a more experienced Premier (together with a more experienced Attorney General, Brad Hazzard having only
been Attorney from 23 April 2014 in Baird’s Cabinet reshuffle) the premature step of reviewing bail laws may not
have been undertaken.
9 Bail Act 1977 (Vic) s 4; Bail Act 1980 (Qld) s 16.
10 Such as applications to detain offenders after the expiration of a sentence or where family law orders are designed
to protect children and as part of the sentencing process when suggestions of future dangerousness arise:
Alexandridis: [33]; Lago: [10]‐[12].
11 The discussion of (c) and (d) was redacted in the published version of the Hawi decision.
12 A ‘Judgment Summary’ in R v Hawi [2014] NSWSC 837 was made available on 23 June 2014 (Supreme Count of
NSW 2014a). Unfortunately, the Judgment Summary (now unavailable on the Supreme Court website) did not
disclose the reasons for granting bail only that the ‘unacceptable risks’ could be mitigated by bail conditions.
Unusually in the judgment the orders include at [58]: ‘3. I direct that an unredacted form of this judgment is not to
be published, other than to the Attorney General, until further order.’ The judgment was finally made available in
early August 2014.
13 A redacted version of the decision in Fesus was made available some days later and Adams J commented ‘Because
of the ensuing publicity, I have decided that some parts of my reasons should be published.’ (Fesus: [1])
14 Originally only a ‘Judgment Summary: Hawi v R [2014] NSWCCA 83’ (Bathurst CJ, Price and McCallum JJ, 16 May
2014) (see Supreme Court of NSW 2014b) was made available, however, after Hawi pleaded guilty to manslaughter
on 5 September 2014 the judgment was published: Hawi v R [2014] NSWCCA 83.
15 Although that view is not beyond question, see for instance, Wacando v Commonwealth (1981) 148 CLR 1 at 15‐16
(Gibbs CJ), 23 (Mason J) which indicates that a court can obtain assistance from the preamble in ascertaining the
meaning of an operative provision. See also Pearce and Geddes (2011: [4.48]).
16 The new factors (s 18(1)(f), (g), (n), (o) and (p)) emphasise the rhetoric of ‘tough on crime’ and protection of the
community with an accused’s criminal associations (g) and the views of victims and their families (n), (o) becoming
factors.
17 We note a contra argument in Flowchart 2 in the Bail Amendment Act 2014 (NSW) which suggests the s 18 factors
are taken into account. The Flowchart, however, is ‘illustrative’ only (s 16(3)) and s 19 does not so provide.
18 In the debate on the Bill, Lynch (2014: 4) decscribed the proposition that a show‐cause test can be distinguished
from the former presumptions as: ‘That is an interesting argument—almost as interesting as arguing about how
many angels can fit on the head of a pin.’
19 Hatzistergos (2014: [223]) indicates that in Victoria there is a divergence of authority on whether the question of
unjustifiable risk falls to be determined as part of showing cause or whether, it is an additional matter that needs to
be determined if the accused successfully shows cause. However, the recent decision of Woods v DPP [2014] VSC 1
suggests that the defendant must first discharge the onus of showing cause and then the prosecution must establish
unacceptable risk.
20 See Lacey & Lacey v DPP [207] QSC 291; Van Tongeren v ODPP (Qld) [2013] QMC 16 at [110]‐[116].
21 Although it is noted that this argument assumes the unacceptable risk assessment references back to s 18, which is
not clear (as discussed above).
22 Part of a more general ‘anti‐elites’ politics (Hindess and Sawyer 2004).
23 This is part of a more general phenomenon described by Ryan (2005) as ‘the rise of the public voice’, by Loader
(2006) as the ‘fall of the platonic guardians’, and by Garland as the ‘declining influence of social expertise’ (Garland
2001: 150).
24 For a previous NSW example, see Tink and Whelan 2013.
25 R v Wakefield (1969) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 300 at 325.
26 See Safe Night Out Legislation Amendment Act 2014 (Qld) s 314A ‘Unlawful striking causing death’ (which was
passed on 18 September 2014); Sentencing Amendment (Coward’s Punch Manslaughter and Other Matters) Act 2014
(Vic) s 4A ‘Manslaughter – single punch or strike taken to be dangerous act’; and Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 9C
which provides for a mandatory minimum for such offences of 10 years (passed on 18 September 2014).
27 See for instance Dale et al 2014 in relation to reporting on the grant of bail to Fesus and Morri and Auerback T
2014 in relation to Hawi.
28 While we have emphasised the leading role played by the Daily Telegraph in undermining the new bail reforms, it
should be noted that the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) promoted the ‘community anxiety about new laws’ line, a
theme that was particularly evident in some articles; for instance of Paul Bibby (see Bibby 2014b) as did radio talk
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back hosts not usually in the ‘shock jock’ mode, such as Richard Glover on ABC 702. It was only when the
Government announced the Hatzistergos Review that the SMH became more critical and questioned its timing: see
Bibby and Whitbourn (2014).
29 See note 4 above.
28 For example The NSW LRC [15:35] recommended the listing of responses available to police where they suspect a
failure to comply with a conduct direction, as a response to suggestions that police had no options but to arrest.
This was incorporated in the Act (s 77(1) with options to take no action, issue a warning, issue a Court Attendance
Notice or arrest. The intention was that the proportion of revocations of bail for minor technical breaches be
reduced. Brown (2013) suggests in relation to a drop in juvenile detentions that ‘it may be that the debate
surrounding the Law Reform Commission Inquiry and Report and the Attorney General’s response has already had
an effect on bail decision‐makers and on the complex organisational and cultural climate, in the direction of a more
“resilient” attitude to the grant of bail’. (Brown, 2013:95).
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